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What does it mean to say ‘I made the right decision?

Right or wrong, like aesthetic judgments, seem to be not so clear.

If right or wrong means ‘corresponds to reality(or reflect comparisons between ideas like unicorns which may as well stand in for real thing) or follows rationally from premises,
-dragons are bigger than unicorns is correct? Neither dragons nor unicorns correspond with reality, but they are real ideas and we can refer to them as if they are real

then you could say for example ‘I want to get on the bus number 5. If I then got on bus number 2, I can say that I made the wrong decision aka incorrect decision. But that’s not really what it means to say I made the right or wrong decision. Anything involving value judgments, whether aesthetic or moral, seems ultimately to necessarily be subjective. “I did the wrong thing’ might mean that I did something which makes me unhappy either now, or will later. That could mean hurting someone else. That could make us happy or sad, and will reflect on how we appraise the action.

We can construct morality or ethics in a sort of logical matter. We can make axioms like ‘suffering is bad’, or ‘freedom is good’, but they must be assumed dogmatically. It’s really not much different than someone saying ‘freedom is good’ ‘why?’? We ask ‘God says so’, they reply. An atheist person says ‘freedom is good’ ‘why?’I think so. But once we are able to dogmatically accept some basic axioms, we can construct a moral argument or a life plan, an then appraise our actions or the actions of others as right or wrong accordingly.

Are my own moral constructions binding on others, if these moral structures are based on value judgements and axiomatic claims which are necessarily subjective?
Only if my moral construction contains a premise which allows me to judge others and put them in line. If this is my contention, that morality is subjective, I must be ready and willing to accept the actions of others who’s subjective moral constructions contain axioms which allow for violent or fascistic behavior toward those who don’t agree with their moral constructions.

In the first place I rely on an axiom that says suffering is bad, in order to judge other moral constructions as bad. I must dogmatically believe that, and have another axiomatic belief that defending the other axiom must be done at all costs.

That’s a subjective judgment itself and I could be wrong. Morality

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